MAKEPEACE LAKE, MANITOBA, CANADA — The Transportation Safety Board of Canada released report A25C0103 on 19 November 2026 into the fatal Makepeace Lake floatplane accident, highlighting the importance of reliable weight-and-balance information before commercial dispatch. The board said the available evidence could not establish the final moments of the flight.
New Report Concerns a September 2025 Accident
The MHA Enterprises Ltd. float-equipped De Havilland DHC-2 Mk. I was flying from St. Theresa Point to Makepeace Lake, Manitoba, on 13 September 2025. Four passengers died and the pilot was seriously injured after the aircraft struck terrain and a post-impact fire developed. The new development is publication of the investigation report, not another crash.
Calculation Raised Questions That the Fire Limited
Using the current weight-and-balance amendment, TSB calculated a takeoff weight below the maximum permitted, but a centre of gravity behind the rear limit. The report also says historical records were destroyed in the fire, preventing verification of the accuracy of the calculated centre of gravity. These qualifications matter: being below a maximum weight does not establish correct balance, and the calculation should not be represented as a proven sole cause of the accident.
The report’s safety messages call for owners and operators to make accurate weight-and-balance information available to pilots before dispatch. It also reiterates the investigative value of lightweight data recorders in commercial aircraft. The release is a limited-scope class 4 investigation; TSB does not assign civil or criminal liability.
HSE Blog Analysis
For aviation operators, a recurring calculation outside an approved limit requires resolution, even when staff suspect an underlying record is wrong. The safety function of a record depends on its accuracy and on a clear process for challenging it. Informally discounting a result leaves the people doing the work without a dependable basis for a decision.
That is also a broader lesson in keeping risk assessments useful. Assumptions about equipment configuration, cargo and operating conditions should be checked when evidence challenges them. This analysis concerns assurance practices; it does not reconstruct the pilot’s decisions or add findings that the investigators could not establish.
Investigation limitations should remain visible when lessons are shared. Missing data can justify stronger future recording and verification arrangements without supporting a definitive explanation of an event’s final seconds.
Sources and Verification
Checked: TSB’s indexed 19 November release, its indexed report text, the official occurrence page, Canadian Press coverage indexed by the Winnipeg Free Press and Maplestime’s secondary account. Three organisations were checked; the latter accounts are not substitutes for the investigator. Direct TSB page retrieval returned 403, but search retrieval exposed the dated primary release, report text and explicit evidential limitations. No claim of an independently confirmed final cause is made.
Featured image: original AI-generated conceptual illustration, not an actual event photograph, technical diagram or evidence of site conditions. Original source imagery remains available with the linked publisher; no unverified photograph is reproduced.
Source
Transportation Safety Board of Canadatsb.gc.ca


